Kinetic Operations and Heavy Weapons in Pakistan’s Counterterrorism: Effectiveness, Limits, and Civilian Impact

Abstract

Counterterrorism activities in post-9/11 Pakistan have been taking place in a complicated security landscape that is characterized by poor state presence in the former tribal areas, deep-rooted local organizations, and a military system that is mostly focused on conventional conflicts. This paper will look into the significance of heavy conventional weapons in these operations and argues that they are extremely conditional with regard to their efficacy. However, the tactical benefits gained by the use of artillery, armor and air power, when applied in civilian-populated areas have high strategic and moral costs, including collateral damage, denial of livelihood, and undermining of operational credibility. All these effects threaten to legitimize insurgent discourses and destabilize the situation in the long run. The discussion shows that isolation of kinetic success cannot provide sustainable counterterrorism results and that there is a need to trade or balance firepower and intelligence-led targeting, population protection, and post-operation rehabilitation. This means that heavy weapons must be used as context-specific enablers, and not default tools, in the case counterterrorism activities are meant to help establish lasting peace, as opposed to repeating violence.