



Kinetic Operations and Heavy Weapons in Pakistan's Counterterrorism: Effectiveness, Limits, and Civilian Impact

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Abstract: Counterterrorism activities in post-9/11 Pakistan have been taking place in a complicated security landscape that is characterized by poor state presence in the former tribal areas, deep-rooted local organizations, and a military system that is mostly focused on conventional conflicts. This paper will look into the significance of heavy conventional weapons in these operations and argues that they are extremely conditional with regard to their efficacy. However, the tactical benefits gained by the use of artillery, armor and air power, when applied in civilian-populated areas have high strategic and moral costs, including collateral damage, denial of livelihood, and undermining of operational credibility. All these effects threaten to legitimize insurgent discourses and destabilize the situation in the long run. The discussion shows that isolation of kinetic success cannot provide sustainable counterterrorism results and that there is a need to trade or balance firepower and intelligence-led targeting, population protection, and post-operation rehabilitation. This means that heavy weapons must be used as context-specific enablers, and not default tools, in the case counterterrorism activities are meant to help establish lasting peace, as opposed to repeating violence.

Key Words: Kinetic Operations, The Counterterrorism Operations, Heavy Weaponry, Civilian Protection Operations, Operations to Ensure Operational Legitimacy, Collateral Damage, Pakistan, The Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Strategic Stability Operations

Introduction

The post 9/11 USA initiated War on Terror has had a significant influence on Pakistan, where it has been waged as a war against terrorism but in exceptional and difficult terms. Historically, the tribal regions of Pakistan, especially the formal Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have had a semi-autonomous status, and these controlled regions have not been fully controlled by the central government in centuries (Fair, 2014). Such absence of total government writ provided a good environment to terrorist groups to occupy strongholds making counter-terrorism efforts more complicated. The military movements that were used in these areas were frequently logistically, culturally, and operationally difficult because of the rough terrain, strongly established tribal traditions, and the widespread power of militant ideologies (Gopal, 2014). Moreover, the socio-political relationships in these regions, such as resistance of the local community to foreign interference, rivalry of different militants have also been an obstacle to the peace-making process (Rashid, 2008). This made the military operations there very complex, and thus, required a delicate strategy throughout, which would strike a balance between the kinetic operations and attempts to think locally by winning the hearts and minds of the locals. This complex situation highlights the complexity of the issues of establishing effective counter-terrorism policies in areas where there is a history of autonomy and where the local culture is well-established and rooted (Jones & Fair, 2010).

The Armed Forces of Pakistan, which are trained on the concept of conventional warfare, were highly challenged in relation to fighting terrorism in their respective communities and boundaries. These intangible forces, which include different groups of militants, unlike other conventional forces, skillfully disguised themselves in the tribal systems of self-defense and integrated perfectly into the indigenous people (Shah, 2018). This counter-measured approach of the

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terrorists complicated the work of the military, where it became a tedious job to separate the combatants and the civilians (Fair, 2014). The established tribal practices and loyalties acted as the veil of protection to the militants as they were able to conduct their activities with relative impunity. Moreover, the geography and socio-political situation in the territories that included former FATA worsened these difficulties since militants used their local experience and relations to their benefit (Gopal, 2014). The insufficient training of the Pakistan armed forces on counter-terrorism also hindered proper responses that resulted in a long and complicated war. These dynamics forced a re-examination of the military strategies noting that counter-terrorism training and community involvement is essential to deal with the distinctiveness of this internal (Jones & Fair, 2010). The experience highlighted how a multi-faceted strategy that involved kinetic responses and intervening in support mechanisms of the militants in the community was necessary. Formal administration of tribal areas in Pakistan, especially under the controversial Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1861 was a thorn in the flesh to the Pakistan Armed Forces in its counter-terrorism campaign. Such communities were exposed to little writ of government since they were submerged in a customary tribal justice that was deep rooted and well oriented among the tribal elders (Nichols, 2013). There were skilled maneuvers by the terrorists who took advantage of the emotional attachment of the tribal to the FCR and their lack of knowledge about the formal form of governance (Fair, 2014). Such exploitation helped militants to be tactically invisible given that they easily fit within the tribal context, and in many occasions, with the tacit or expressed assistance of the local leaders (Gopal, 2014). Efforts by the Pakistan army to impose the writ of the government was therefore met with resistance whereby the advancement of the state authority was seen as a foreign invasion in the normal ways of life. This not just augmented the military operations but also enabled the militants to continue with their operations and escape without being noticed (Jones & Fair, 2010). The scenario highlighted the necessity of an enticing strategy that would take into account the local practices in such a way that would slowly incorporate formal governance structures and thus fight terrorism successfully.

The complexity of warfare against terrorism in Pakistan is aggravated by the fact that it is difficult to determine who the combatant with blurred identities was. It is very challenging to draw the line between an ally and an enemy amid such a hostile environment, as terrorists tend to exploit such grayness to penetrate operations and assume a false identity as a fake informer (Jones & Fair, 2010). The Pakistan army is in a twofold predicament of not collaterally damaging and at the same time protecting integrity of its intelligence. What is even more complex in the situation is the historical context in which militants who were previously referred to as Mujahedeen and were backed by the masses as well as the army are now against the state (Shah, 2018). Such change of allegiance causes a certain mental strain among the army and the population, as it is difficult to accept and comprehend the changed identities of these previously bothied people (Fair, 2014). The once-hailed heroes, the Mujahedeen, are being viewed as terrorists, and it creates confusion and opposition in adopting the fact that they are dangerous. This historical and psychological context makes the efforts of counter-terrorism operations in particular delicate, with the focus on the role of effective communication and strategic missions, to find the right way in the convoluted environment of the contemporary asymmetric warfare (Gopal, 2014). In order to attain strategic dominance in state-on-state conflicts, the standard military services have always been particularly concerned with the creation and utilization of long-range precision weapons including advanced artillery and airdropped bombs. These systems are most applicable in the long-range conflict when the firepower and precision can be applied to the enemy successfully. Nevertheless, the employment of long-range weaponry poses severe tactical challenges during the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and the counterterrorism (CT) operations, which more often than not, occur in densely populated urban environments. It takes close quarter fighting in the urban warfare where one cannot tell whether the people are soldiers or civilians and more likely to cause collateral damage. Under such circumstances, the use of long-range, high-explosive weapons may cause accidental civilian casualties and damages to the infrastructure, which may undermine the legitimacy of military operations and reinforce insurgent discourses (Coble et al., 2024). Moreover, traditional forces are often inadequately equipped and trained to engage in a close-quarters battle and win. In some cases the emphasis on long-range weapons has resulted in short-range weapons and tactics being neglected in favor of long-range weapons, which are not needed in urban combat. This readiness gap may undermine the effectiveness of COIN and CT operations that need flexibility and accuracy to be deployed over short distances. As per the latest reviews, the army needs to include the training programmes underlining the urban warfare



and evolution of skills and tactics which should be applicable in the privacy of close-range warfare. The complex topography of the urban environment can also render the long-range artillery less efficient as the infrastructure and buildings obstruct the sightlines and complicate the system of aiming. This requires a shift to the more flexible warfare methods (Modern War Institute, 2023).

The intricate nature of field operations, including how to differentiate between combatants and civilians, prevent collateral damage, and deal with the infiltration of fake informers can be used to gain a deeper understanding of the best counter-terrorism operations (Gopal, 2014). Also, the fact that militants that were previously backed up as Mujahedeen currently turned against the state is another complexity factor to the conflict (Shah, 2018). This historical and psychological background requires a subtle strategy that involves the use of kinetic activities and activities aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the local people. By filling this gap in knowledge, the research could help in developing holistic strategies to merge modern warfare tactics with the peace-making activities, with the ultimate aim of achieving sustainable peace in the areas where terrorism is a common phenomenon (Jones & Fair, 2010).. On the basis of this, there is a vital dilemma on the use of conventional weaponry in non-conventional battlefields. Although traditional weapons like artillery and air support may be effective to improve the tactical capability, their use in civilian-infested or irregular war zones brings serious ethical and strategic dilemmas. Incorrect decisions when using force may result in civilian deaths, make local people distrust the government and provide unintentionally a narrative to the insurgents. The paper, in this way, looks at the calculus of operations involved in using conventional weaponry in such situations with a stress on the significance of precision, targeting based on intelligence, and following the international norms of humanitarian. This study aims to shed light on how state armies may balance military effectiveness and the need to safeguard the non-combatant population through the application of lessons learned in previous operations and the current counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency principles.

Materials and Methods


This study utilized convergent mixed-methods design, which combines both quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to enhance the rigor of the analysis. The quantitative data were collected through a structured survey done to 52 commissioned officers; the obtained data was subjected to a descriptive statistical analysis, and the findings were then represented by a chart and tables to explain the relevant trends and patterns. Semi-structured interviews were conducted on 25 senior-ranking officers, which were considered the high ranking personnel involved in the research study. Interview transcripts were drafted and underwent thematic analysis which made it easier to identify the main themes and insightful interpretation. The combination of the results of the survey and the analysis of interviews gave an overall, triangulated understanding of the research issue.

Results and Discussion

The structured quantitative survey given to commissioned officers was used to draw the data in a graphical manner and systematically captured responses on key variables, which were based on the objectives of the study.

Figure 1


Rank Distribution of the Respondents



The hierarchy followed by the personnel involved in the kinetic counterterrorism activities of Pakistan reflects the presence of a multi-tiered decision and operation responsibility system within the security organ. As the sample is analyzed, it is shown that Majors 30.8% and Captains 26.9% are the representations of the respondents, which include more than half of the cohort. Conversely, the senior officers (Brigadiers 15.4% and Colonels 9.6%) and junior officers (Lieutenants) occupy relatively small proportions of the operational force. The trend proves that counterterrorism operations are no longer allocated to senior tactical commanders or strategic planners; instead, the execution and critical decision-making operations are devolved to various hierarchy levels. The sample size of the mid-level officers reflects their primary importance in the transformation of the strategic instructions into the field action including counterattacking targets, coordinating patrols, and communicating with civilian communities in conflict-impacted regions. Similarly, the involvement of top-level officers demonstrates the necessary supervision, organization, and combination of intelligence and operational contributions to the larger counterterrorism plans. This decision-making, but participatory form is used to demonstrate that the counterterrorism system in Pakistan is based on a combination of the field-level judgment and high-level supervision, whereby operational decisions are made on the basis of both field realities and institutional prescriptions. This type of distribution does not only enhance the flexibility of operations but also reduces effects of unilateral decision-making, which promotes a more coordinated and context-sensitive way of dealing with asymmetric threats in the context of civilian-populated settings.


Figure 2

Branch of Service of the Respondents




The demographic distribution of the respondents who were spread between the military branches is notable in that 29 respondents occupying 55.77% of the sample were from Armour. This overrepresentation indicates that the data is strongly influenced by the working experience and the views of the Armour, which may bring bias to the data based on the branch, especially regarding the priorities of the tactic, the engagement procedures, and the perception of the operational performance. The second place goes to the Infantry, with 11 participants (21.15%), and the next category is the Artillery, which has 10 respondents (19.23%). Though these two branches taken together represent a source of useful information regarding the operations of the front line combat, and the practical difficulties involved in fighting in active fighting areas, their aggregate determining still does not represent a very high percentage of that of the Armour. The composite branch of Infantry and Artillery, however considerable, is not compensated by the powerful Armour group. Such an imbalance could constrain the generalizability of the results to the operational contexts at large scale. Aviation and Engineering units, on the contrary, have the minimal representation, with only one participant in each (1.92%). This sparseness suggests a possible implementer in the coverage of the views on aerial support, technical logistics and specialized functionalities. The distribution observed highlights the fact that when interpreting the findings it is important to consider the influence of the branches. The practice of the branches that they represent in large numbers may unduly influence general studies of how operational decisions are made, how the branches work together, and what difficulties arise when the branches conduct counter-terrorism operations in civilian-populated settings. These differences are imperative in terms of putting the conclusions of the study into perspective and in creating a subtle comprehension of how the various arms of the military interpret and implement their respective functions in asymmetric conflict environments.

Figure 3
Years of Counterterrorism of the Respondents



The years of service distribution of military officers in counter terrorism activities has a clear concentration of the years in the range of 02 years, which implies that the exposure to counter terrorism activities is highly limited to relatively short periods of an officer career. The officers in this group will probably have obtained some basic experience in operations with limited deployments or in having taken part in particular mission tasks and this may not offer vast chances of gaining deep-seated tactical or strategic know-how. The second-largest group, which included 3-5 years of exposure (19.2%), is the group of officers who are of middle operation experience. It is assumed that such people have been involved in more than one counter terrorism operation or have gone through systematic tactical training courses and thus gained a more significant appreciation of operational dynamics and challenges in the field. The coverage out of this range is much worse, as only 1.9% of the respondents are within the 9-10 year bracket and 5.8% of those with more than ten years of counter terrorism experience. Officers in such longer service categories are often placed in specialized or strategic duties, such as planning, policy creation, or the management of complex operations, which form an uncommon group with long-term and extensive experience of counter terrorism constructs. This distribution highlights a structural trend in the working force, most of the personnel only getting a little episodic experience. This trend can have an impact on the tactical views and risk judgments used in the field. This service-length distribution is a key to understanding the patterns of professional competencies and decision-making that can be found in the functioning of various levels of the counter terrorism apparatus.

Figure 4
Branch of Service × Employment of the Other Arms (e.g., aircraft, tanks, artillery) on Infantry Roles




The results reveal that the vast majority of the respondents in all the branches (44 out of 52) reported agreement on the use of other Arms in the Infantry missions, and how they found them useful in kinetic counter terrorism missions. None of the strong disagreement was registered and a minority of the respondents (8) were neutral. The level of agreement was highest in the Armour (29/29), then Artillery (8/10) and Infantry (8/11) and least in the special branches

like the Aviation and the Engineering, which only gave neutral responses due to their minimal exposure to combat situations that are ground-centric. This allocation highlights the widely owned belief by officers on the tactical benefits of incorporating several Arms in frontline Infantry actions, and there is an understanding of the synergy between mechanized, artillery, and infantry capabilities in improving operational capabilities.

However, this positive impression is checked by negative observations of recent counter insurgency literature. (Coble et al., 2024). argue that long-range and high-explosive systems create high operational and ethical burdens in an urban or irregular warfare, in which there is already a high complexity in separating combatants and noncombatants. The unselective application of such force or excessive application of such force is likely to unintentionally hamper operational legitimacy, worsen the situation of civilian casualties, and support insurgent propaganda campaigns. In line with this view, studies conducted by the Modern Combat Institute (2023) indicate that excessive focus on long-range capabilities can unintentionally reduce the formation of the necessary short-range and close-quarters combat abilities, which are required in the populated or irregular military operational conditions. Collectively, these results indicate a subtle operational calculus: although the incorporation of other Arms into the Infantry functions are often appreciated and may aid in more tactical agility, its application should be carefully balanced to reduce the risks of collateral damage, civilian trust should not be lost, and the legitimacy of counterterrorism measures should not be defective.

Figure 5
Ranks x The Use of Heavy Weaponry as a Conventional Strategy



According to the survey findings, a significant majority of the officers (38 of the 52; 82.7%), admit that the use of heavy conventional weapons in the civilian-populated regions causes collateral damage. The awareness of this effect grows significantly when it comes to higher ranks. This observation corresponds to current literature, claiming that long-range artillery and air-delivered ammunition are both very effective in conventional, state-on-state conflict, but both have very high liabilities in counter insurgency (COIN) and counter terrorism (CT) settings (Coble et al., 2024). This seems especially sensitive to senior officers who, more often, are exposed to strategic consequences and who are better aware of the overall political and societal price of operations, and this is where tactical firepower can be seen as damaging operational legitimacy, causing civilian casualties, and fanning insurgent propaganda.

On the other hand, the fact that minority of neutral (15.4 %) and dissenting (11.5 %) answers is highly-concentrated in junior-mid and senior officers indicates that there is operational ambivalence. Officers of these grades frequently experience the short-term defensive value of heavy fires in actions, but at the same time, observe their counterproductive effects in towns and places where civilians are many. This mismatch depicts a structural readiness gap: units that are built to fight traditional wars do not often have the short-range accuracy, city maneuverability and civilian safety skills they need to make successful COIN and CT missions (Modern War Institute, 2023). It has an operational implication; heavy weapons should be redefined as conditional enablers instead of default solutions. The systematic systems of urban warfare training, scenario-based exercises, and restraint-focused framework of decision making should be systematically incorporated in the military doctrine to effect meaningful reform. The combination of

close-quarter strategies, targeting based on intelligence, and effective civilian protection standards can help the counterterrorist forces in Pakistan to simultaneously attain both the goals of effectiveness in operations and preservation of the legality, thereby addressing the political, social, and ethical consequences of the indiscriminate or excessive application of heavy firepower.

Operational and Ethical Challenges of Heavy Weapon Use in Civilian-Present Conflict Zones: A Critical Analysis

The use of heavy weaponry in areas of war among civilians is a confluence of tactical, strategic, and ethical issues. The obstacles of such operations cannot be traced more to a lack of training on the side of personnel; but to the political and administrative atmosphere which surrounds military interventions. Military operations are mainly influenced by the general political-administrative climate under which operations are carried out and not the absence of military preparation. Members of any of the branches are trained with basic infantry training, giving them a general skill set that allows them to be employed in an adaptable way across a range of operational capabilities. This common ground help to maintain the disciplined and professional application of the supporting arms and the maintenance of operational sense in the unconventional situations. Even though operational competency is not lost to a large extent, the humanitarian and strategic consequences of using heavy weapons are immense. Measures like destruction of crops or attacks on infrastructure can be considered as necessary to cut off insurgent financial webs or control over territory, but in cases where such actions are not supplemented with programs to help people live alternatively or later governance efforts, such measures can cause acute civilian distress. This loss highlights a key problem of modern counterinsurgency: when successful on the battlefield, you will not be stable at the strategic level. Civilian populations of the target of military actions may even turn to the insurgent groups not because of their ideological orientation, but mainly because of the necessity to earn money.

"ma apko aik choti se example deta hun jis waqt ham ne khyber clear kia sir aaapoppy k khait thay sir ... poppy k khaiton ko hamary order tha ham ne ka agg laga di ... agg lagana asan kamm ha maa wahan pe aik buzurg chacha type thay sir mene onko sath leky ma beth gaya jinka khait tha. Maine onse puch k apka ye khait se ap kitna paisa kamaingy I'm talking about 2013 he said ma is se artalis hazar rupy kamaunga jis se ma pora saal apni bewa beti or osky do bachon ka pait bharunga... sir ma isko to agg laga dunga maine PA se pucha ap isko alternate kia do ge? Os ne kaha I don't have any alternate! Now sir mujhe ye batain ye banda agar government ki taraf dekhta ha, government kehti ha maine support nahi karna... mujhe batain ye kyun mangal bap k pass jaye ye kyun na ttp k pas jaye onse boly mujhe aik ied do ma lagaunga bees hazar rupy mujhe tum dedo ye dosri laga de maine tees hazar or dedo pachas hazar mere requirement thi maine bachon ka pait bhar liya ... agar ham kehty hain k ye pait onky sath nahi laga hua to ham ghalat bat karrhy hain sir wo bhi osi trha ki human beings ha jo wahan k locals hain... hamay segregation ki zaroorat ha k terrorist kon hain effecty kon hain jo effecty hain os pe government ko support karny ki zaroorat ha ... or sirf fouj ki taraf nahi dekhna ha apna mechanism onhon ne wahan pe enforce karna ha this is my take!"

(Translation: The next case in point is the one related to the time, when Khyber Pass was captured. It was at that time that there were large fields of poppy and the order of the operation required their burning. The mission of incinerating them was deemed easy. One of those fields belonged to an elderly farmer, here called the subject. I asked him about the possible income that can be obtained on the crop. In 2013, he estimated that he would receive forty-eight thousand rupees of that one field that he estimated would provide the dietary needs of his widowed daughter and her two children throughout the year. I therefore told him about the desire to burn the field. When I asked the field agent whether there were any other relief that could be given, the field agent replied that he could not provide any other support. I then put the question to the party administration: whether the subject requests government aid and the government does not render the aid, why should he refer to the Mangal Bagh or Tehrik-i-Tawheed-Palang (TTP) to get the assistance? This induced a feeling of the subject supplying an improvised explosive device (IED), which in my opinion the government could provide him with thirty-thousand rupees to buy another explosive device (the second device), with a total of fifty thousand rupees, which would enable him to feed the children. The assumption that the fans of the protagonist do not share their livelihood is incorrect; he has a common human essence with the people living in the area. It is evident that there should be a difference between people who are referred as terrorists and those



who are terrorized. The latter group should be supported by the government, and not only military actions can be offered. The problems at the level of self-regulation of the local system require improvement to resolve the problem roots.)

Ethically, civil-military asymmetries are a major complication of counterterrorism activities. Even though military actors have the technical capacity to achieve their operational objectives with accuracy, they often have no jurisdiction, resources, and institutional structures needed to meet the post-conflict needs of the civilian masses. In turn, a sharp gap between tactical success and strategic stability appears, in which case the kinetic operation can accidentally intensify the social discontents or destroy the trust at the local level. The above phenomena highlight the necessity to integrate operation planning in which the coordination of kinetic operations with governance efforts, humanitarian relief, and socio congregational rehabilitation campaigns are organized. By linking military interventions with the strategies that are oriented at the protection of civilians and reviving the community resilience, counterterrorism initiatives will not only help eradicate the immediate threats but also help to create the environment that would favour sustainable peace and mitigate the risk of perpetuating the cycles of violence and creating the environment conducive to the long-term stability.

Precision, Population Control, and the Conditional Effectiveness of Heavy Weapons: Analytical Conclusion

The military effectiveness of heavy weapons in the civilian-proximate environment is highly conditional, based on a proper level of population control, precise intelligence and strict discipline in using force. According to the interrogation records, difficulties associated with artillery and airpower are significantly lowered in the event that operations are carefully planned and ordered. Through the case study of Operation Rah-e-Nejat (2010) it can be seen that prior warnings helped in making large volumes of people move out of the operational battle field thus dramatically turning the battle field into a depopulated battle field. This preemptive approach minimized collateral casualties and made it much easier to trace any hostile forces and as a result this mitigated political as well as military risk that used to be linked to heavy weaponry. In operations, heavy weapons were used selectively as opposed to being used indiscriminately. Only after the withdrawal of civilians were artillery barrage and airstrikes carried out with selective precision and economical daintiness. Airpower was favored to artillery in regions like South Waziristan and Balochistan because of topography and the need to be targeted. It is this associated selective methodology that highlights a doctrine motivated by reducing civilian casualties and maintaining operational legitimacy which proves the existence of kinetic escalation as part of larger population-control operations. Multilateral flexibility and intensive training added to operational efficiency as well. When transferred to infantry duties, the personnel who were previously in the supporting branches but were assigned to infantry service received a pre-induction training that trained them both psychologically and physically to fight insurgencies. This solution made cross-arm integration easier and enhanced the argument that supporting arms would not be a liability but an asset. Despite these protection measures the use of the heavy weaponry implies the risk of the moral and practical character. Complete discrimination between combatants and non-combatants is not guaranteed and material damage can be done.

"wo to sir aik cheez lkn sir wo forces ki ye cheez thik ha k jab bhi operation shuru karny se pehle wo locals ko kehty hain k apky pass time ha orr enough time hota ha sir k wo nikal jain to osme chances jo hain human life k minimum hoty hain or koshish bhi forces ki yahi rehti ha sir k isko ensure kia jaye"

(Translation: The abovementioned concept, Sir, is accurate in terms of activities whereby the communities concerned are made aware of sufficient time outlay before they start. It is in such foresight communication that an exodus out of the venue is supposedly triggered, so that a small number of human casualties are minimized. Furthermore, the pressure that is subjected to military forces is also reduced and this in turn guarantees efficiency during operations.)

The organizational procedures embedded in the counterterrorism paradigm of Pakistan that demonstrates a conscious prioritization of the civilian life, especially in the urban or highly populated settings, displays an orderly attitude towards harm reduction. It has been reported that before operations begin, the forces make regular advance notification to area residents, and allow ample time to enable the residents to evacuate the area in orderly fashion. This operational

precaution is meant to reduce the number of civilian casualties, and this highlights an inherent adherence to ethical and humanitarian standards in the implementation of kinetic operations. This is because by systematically integrating evacuation plans into the strategic plan, the military not only reduces the short-term threat of noncombatants, but it also serves to strengthen the perception of legitimacy and acceptability of such measures to the residents of the territory. These procedural measures increase the ethical legitimacy of activities, which strengthens the unity of trust and adherence to national security programs. Moreover, these precautions are playing alongside broader tactical decision-making proceedings. The commanders have to exercise discretion in using the heavy or long range firepower when taking the lives of the civilians into account. The interaction can be seen as an example of how far procedural protection goes hand in hand with traditional operational goals, making it possible to achieve not only operational effectiveness but ethical compliance in sophisticated counterterrorism situations.

Mindset Gaps and Proficiency Limitations in Cross-Arm Infantry Employment: Analytical Conclusion

The use of non-infantry branch personnel in long-lasting infantry roles in counter terrorism operations is a complicated interaction of the needs of the operations, the sufficiency of the training of the personnel, and the design of the institution. An officer is a critical thinker who focuses on the inner ability limitations rather than the outer political/civilian challenges. He cites cognitive dissonance and gaps in weapon proficiency as the main hurdles and states that members of specialized juxtaposing systems still have the doctrinal orientations of their parent systems, which cannot easily be re-calibrated during short courses of pre-induction training.

"onka sor mindset ka issue ha hota hana wo osky mind me ata ha beshak onko pre induction training"

(Translation: In totality, their mindset problem is that it exists; it is manifested in their thoughts. In fact, they are trained in pre-inductions.)

The given point of view underlines that the pre-induction training, though, necessary, is not sufficient to absorb the necessary requirements of the long-term infantry combat. Effective infantry service does not only require basic training or physical fitness training but relies equally on a continuous exposure to the key weaponry, tactical reflexes, and automatic decision making in the circumstances of extreme stress. Interim exposure to infantry gear therefore cannot substitute the multi-year specialization that brings about functional constraints when compared with troops who have attained such professionalism in a natural manner. In addition to personal capabilities, the areas of operational challenges include equipment integration and role ownership. The operators that are dealing with strange firearm systems are less confident and skilled, prompting them to resort to exclusively trained infantry units and slow the tempo of the operations. These performance differences can be traced most in high-pressure conditions of operation where fast and instinctive reactions are paramount.

"sir mere time period me na artillery use hua na air use hua it was basically a peace land rehabilitation thi koi istrha ki cheez wahan pe thi nahi. Choty moty operations chalty thay jo FC k through ho jaty thay baki as such baray heavy weapon wahan pe use nahi hue mere time me."

(Translation: Artillery and aerial weapons were not used during the corresponding period in history. Such military assets were not present in the region which was mostly being rehabilitated in peacetime. Field commands were used to carry out minor operations but no large scale heavy weaponry was used within the period.)

In several stories, there is a common theme: the institutional structures have a strong impact on the results of the cross-arm employment. Wajid notes that non-infantry weapons like armor units or air-defense units are structured around crews, squadrons or troops as opposed to the platoon-based structures of infantry units. Countering insurgency (COIN) operations require reconfiguring those formations, which require disaggregation and refocusing them after which further friction ensues as the formations are inducted and extracted. Despite the fact that these structural exigencies in the initial stages damage the efficiency of operations, the pre-induction training and sequential operating experience effects in the long run balance out the disruptive effects. The adaptation process is reported to happen regularly as a temporary but predictable difficulty. Waqas and Ishtiaq outline a brief adaptation phase between two to

six months where the troops will be familiar with the infantry tactics, terrain and the operational requirements. Though it is a risk period of reduced effectiveness and a higher dependency on more experienced infantry staff, this is considered as a learning curve that is manageable and ultimately levelled off with mentoring, graduated deployment, and developing institutional memory. Conditional benefits are also provided in cross-arm employment. Saad emphasizes on the fact that the contribution of personnel of other arms to the overall agility and sustainability of the infantry units in the unconventional environment is through their varied technical expertise, ability to solve problems, and their operational insights. However, he notes that this type of integration depends on the purpose-specific training, which is role-specific. Ad hoc or generic preparation carries the danger of underutilization of skills or misalignment of operations thus the necessity to institutionalise structures that will help in cross-arm synergy.

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